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FLEMING V. GIULIANI
(decided December 21, 2004)
CHRISTOPHER G. BOIES*
“The power to tax involves the power to destroy.”1
In the 1970s, New York City was in the midst of what the Tem-
porary Committee on City Finances characterized as “nothing less
than a ‘depression’ . . . a period of sharp decline in both the eco-
nomic base . . . and the population.”2  In the twenty years before
1970, it was estimated that nearly one million city residents, many of
them members of the middle-class, left the City and moved to the
suburbs.3  The departure of significant portions of the City’s mid-
dle-class resulted in a population more dependent on government
expenditures than ever before, while the City lost many of those
persons capable of funding such expenditures through the tax reve-
nues they provided.4  During this time, the City also faced a general
decrease in employment.  In the twenty-five years since World War
II, manufacturing employment in the City had declined by half.5
Although, for a time, employment in other industries rose to fill
this gap, the City’s economy began to experience a “sharp contrac-
tion” in 1969, which, by 1977, resulted in the loss of 600,000 jobs.6
The City was, in essence, losing a significant portion of its tax base.
Among the legislative measures enacted by the City Council
during this economically troubled time was New York City Charter
section 1127, a provision obligating nonresident City employees, as
a condition of employment with the City, to make payments in the
form of contractually agreed-upon salary deductions (section 1127
payments) as if they were City residents paying City personal in-
* J.D. candidate New York Law School, 2007.
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).
2. TEMP. COMM. CITY FINANCES, THE CITY IN TRANSITION: PROSPECTS AND POLICIES
FOR NEW YORK 29 (1978).
3. Id. at 22.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Interestingly, the only sector of the City economy that experienced a rise in
employment between 1970 and 1975 was City government. See id. at 23-24.
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come tax.7  At the time of section 1127’s enactment, Mayor John V.
Lindsay said the statute was designed to “help keep our work force
in the City and bring back some suburban residents.”8
In Fleming v. Giuliani, the New York Court of Appeals was
called upon to determine whether section 1127 payments made by
nonresident City employees should be computed using total taxa-
ble income or only the City salary earned by the employee.9  The
court held that the City was entitled to use total taxable income in
computing the payments, basing its decision on a strict reading of
section 1127 along with an analysis of the policies behind the provi-
sion’s enactment.10  The court noted that section 1127 was enacted
to “mitigate such financial incentive that could contribute to City
employees relocating their residences outside of the City.”11  This
case comment contends that the Court of Appeals’ holding in Flem-
ing, while consistent with prior cases interpreting the statute, dem-
onstrates a pressing need to critically reexamine section 1127 in
7. New York City Charter section 1127 provides as follows:
§  1127.  Condition precedent to employment.
a.  Notwithstanding the provisions of any local law, rule or regulation
to the contrary, every person seeking employment with the city of New York
or any of its agencies regardless of civil service classification or status shall
sign an agreement as a condition precedent to such employment to the
effect that  if such person is or becomes a nonresident individual as that
term is defined in section 11-1706 of the administrative code of the city of
New York or any similar provision of such code, during employment by the
city, such person will pay to the city an amount by which a city personal
income tax on residents computed and determined as if such person were a
resident individual, as defined in such section, during such employment,
exceeds the amount of any city earnings tax and city personal income tax
imposed on such person for the same taxable period.
b.  Whenever any provision of this charter, the administrative code of
the city of New York or any rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to
such charter or administrative code  employs  the  term  “salary”, “compen-
sation”, or any other word or words  having  a  similar  meaning, such terms
shall be deemed and construed to mean the scheduled salary or compensa-
tion of  any employee of the city of New York, undiminished by any amount
payable pursuant to subdivision a of this section.
N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 1127 (2004).
8. See Brief for Petitioners-Appellants at 6, Ganley v. Giuliani, 94 N.Y.2d 207
(1999).
9. Fleming v. Giuliani, 3 N.Y.3d 544, 547-48 (2004).
10. Id.
11. Fleming, 3 N.Y.3d at 551-52 (citing City of New York v. Lieutenants Benevolent
Ass’n, 730 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (1st Dep’t 2001)).
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light of the City’s current economic situation.  Rather than “placing
resident and nonresident City employees on an equal footing,”12
the Court of Appeals’ decision in Fleming places an increased finan-
cial burden on nonresident employees, particularly part-time em-
ployees; a burden that can no longer be justified by the
circumstances that led to section 1127’s enactment.  The court’s
holding has the potential to deter valuable nonresident profession-
als from pursuing or continuing part-time City employment when
such professionals already derive income from private practice
outside the City or other non-City sources and may easily push
more part-time employees into the suburbs.
The plaintiffs in Fleming were thirteen part-time employees13 of
the New York City Police Department.14  Plaintiffs had each been
appointed to the position of Police Surgeon at varying times be-
tween 1981 and 1995.15  In addition to their part-time City employ-
ment, plaintiffs also derived income outside the City from “private
practices and other sources.”16  The plaintiffs all resided outside of
the City.17  Following discovery, they moved for summary judgment
and made three arguments.  First, alleging that they had never exe-
cuted written agreements to make section 1127 payments, plaintiffs
asserted the City had improperly withheld such payments from
their salaries.18  Second, even if the court held that they were
bound to make section 1127 payments, the plaintiffs argued that
the City improperly calculated such payments by using their total
income, rather than the income derived from their work for the
City.19  Third, they sought a declaration that any section 1127 pay-
ments calculated using total income amounted to an unconstitu-
tional tax.20
The City cross-moved for summary judgment, and presented
written agreements of ten of the plaintiffs agreeing to make section
12. Id. at 552.
13. New York City defines a “part-time” employee as one who works less than 35
hours per week. Id.
14. Id. at 548.
15. Brief for Respondents at 5-10, Fleming v. Giuliani, 3 N.Y.3d 544 (2004).
16. Fleming, 3 N.Y.3d at 548.
17. Id. at 549.
18. Id. at 548.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 549.
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1127 payments.21  The City also presented a written certification by
plaintiff Dr. Bernard Paul White that he agreed to “conform to
Chapter 49 of the [City] Charter.”22  The City was unable to locate
any written pre-employment agreements or certifications signed by
plaintiffs Dr. Avtar Josen or Dr. Israel Berkowitz.23  The Supreme
Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted
the City’s cross-motion insofar as it applied to the eleven plaintiffs
for whom some form of written agreement could be found.24  The
court decided, however, that a justiciable controversy existed as to
whether plaintiffs Josen and Berkowitz had ever executed agree-
ments to be bound by the terms of section 1127.25  These plaintiffs
and the City both appealed.
On appeal, the Appellate Division modified the trial court’s
ruling and granted the City’s cross-motion for summary judgment
in its entirety.26  Addressing the plaintiffs’ contentions that section
1127 payments represented an unconstitutional tax, the Appellate
Division cited Matter of Legum v. Goldin27 and reframed the debate
21. Id. at 548.  The obligations currently in place under section 1127 were origi-
nally codified in New York City Charter section 820, later recodified at section 822 and
then recodified again at section 1127. See Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 8,
at 5. Due to the fact that some of the plaintiffs in Fleming had been employed for over
20 years before commencement of their action, some had signed section 822 agree-
ments and others had signed section 1127 agreements.  The obligations under the vari-
ous codifications of the current section 1127 are substantially the same. See Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2 & n.2, Fleming v. Giuliani, 3 N.Y.3d 544 (2004).
22. Fleming, 3 N.Y.3d at 548.  Section 1127 is contained in Chapter 49 of the
Charter.
23. Id. at 548.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Fleming v. Giuliani, 763 N.Y.S.2d 609, 609-10 (1st Dep’t 2003). Despite the fact
that the City was unable to produce any writing whereby plaintiffs Dr. Avtar Josen and
Dr. Israel Berkowitz agreed to make section 1127 payments, the Appellate Division
ruled that their claims against the city were barred under the equitable doctrine of
laches. See id.  The Appellate Division also noted that it had an additional basis for
denying plaintiff Berkowitz’s claim. Id. at 610-11.  Only three and a half months
months following plaintiff Berkowitz’s appointment to the position of Police Surgeon,
Berkowitz had signed an acknowledgment that he had received a copy of Chapter 49 of
the Charter. Id.  As a matter of law, the Appellate Division found that this signed ac-
knowledgment and Berkowitz’s silent acquiescence in the City’s payroll deductions
from his salary for five years gave rise to an implied-in-fact agreement that he would be
bound by the terms of section 1127. Id.
27. 55 N.Y.2d 104 (1982).
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in contractual terms: “The mere fact that [a] debt incurred pursu-
ant to [a] contract of employment is owed to the City of New York
does not transform it into a tax.”28  As for determining the sources
of income to which section 1127 should apply, the Appellate Divi-
sion was persuaded by both the legislative history behind the char-
ter provision’s enactment29 and the Court of Appeals’ decision in
Ganley v. Giuliani,30 and held that section 1127 should apply to all
income of the City employee, wherever derived.31  In Ganley, the
Court of Appeals stated: “[section 1127] was intended to equalize
the take-home pay of City employees, both resident and nonresi-
dent, and encourages those who work for the City to live in the
City.”32  The Appellate Division in Fleming held that such purpose
could “only be realized by applying section 1127 to all income.”33
Plaintiffs were granted leave to appeal by the Court of Appeals.34
The Court of Appeals began its review of the decision below by
noting that the issue of whether section 1127 applied to all taxable
income or merely the nonresident employee’s City salary had not
been considered in either Legum or Ganley; thus, the specific issue
raised by plaintiffs in Fleming was one of first impression.35  The
court observed that the language of section 1127(a) requires an in-
dividual seeking City employment to enter into an agreement
28. Fleming, 763 N.Y.S.2d at 610 (quoting Matter of Legum v. Goldin, 55 N.Y.2d
104, 108 (1982) (holding that a full-time City employee of the New York City Law De-
partment was bound by section 1127 and that payments under this section do not con-
stitute a tax)); see also Central Sav. Bank v. New York, 279 N.Y. 266, 281 (1938) (“A tax is
a forced charge levied by the State upon persons or property. It operates in invitum and
is in no way dependent upon the will or contract, express or implied, of the persons
taxed.”).
29. See id.
30. Fleming, 763 N.Y.S.2d 609 at 610 (citing Ganley v. Giuliani, 94 N.Y.2d 207
(1999) (holding that full-time employees of the New York City Police Department,
hired by the New York City Transit Authority and Housing Authority Police Depart-
ments before section 1127’s enactment but involuntarily transferred to the New York City
Police Department after section 1127’s enactment were not obligated to make section
1127 payments because the obligations imposed thereunder affected only persons apply-
ing for City employment, not those persons who became City employees as a result of
involuntary transfers)).
31. Id.
32. Ganley, 94 N.Y.2d at 216.
33. Fleming, 763 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
34. Fleming v. Giuliani, 1 N.Y.3d 509 (2004).
35. Fleming, 3 N.Y.3d at 550; see also Legum, 55 N.Y.2d 104; Ganley, 94 N.Y.2d 207.
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“wherein the prospective employee promises to pay the City, if the
employee resides or moves outside the City during the course of
employment, the difference between the ‘city personal income tax
. . . determined as if [the nonresident] were a resident’ and ‘any
city earnings tax and city personal income tax’ actually imposed on
the nonresident.”36  The Court of Appeals noted that the City per-
sonal income tax is imposed on all taxable income of City residents
at a rate varying between 2.907% and 4.45%.37  The fact that the
City resident personal income tax applies to all income, regardless
of source, swayed the Court of Appeals to find that, in calculating
section 1127 payments, the City properly included all income of
nonresident City employees.38  The Court of Appeals rejected plain-
tiffs’ contention that if plaintiffs were obligated to make section
1127 payments, those payments should be calculated using per-
sonal income tax rates applied only to City salaries.39
The court reasoned that plaintiffs’ construction of the statute
would fail both to place resident and nonresident City employees
on an equal footing and to promote the City Council’s goal of “en-
couraging employees to maintain their residences in the City.”40
36. Fleming, 3 N.Y.3d at 550; see also N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 1127 (a) (2004).
37. Fleming, 3 N.Y.3d at 550-51 & n.3 (citing N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 11-1701).
The tax rates indicated here are those rates in effect in 2004, when the Court of Ap-
peals was considering the issues raised in this case.
38. Id. at 552.
39. Id. Indeed, a plausible argument can be made for restricting the taxable base
of income to a City employee’s City wages when one considers section 1127(b), which
states:
Whenever any provision of this charter, the administrative code of the city
of New York or any other rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to such
charter or administrative code employs the term ‘salary’, ‘compensation’,
or any other word or words having similar meaning, such terms shall be
deemed and construed to mean the scheduled salary or compensation of
any employee of the city of New York, undiminished by any amount payable
pursuant to subdivision a of this section.
N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 1127(b) (2004).
Plaintiffs relied on this precise language in claiming that section 1127 payments
should be calculated using only City wages. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra
note 21, at 8-11.  Dismissing these claims, the Court of Appeals stated that section
1127(a) was the dispositive provision at issue and that section 1127(a) made no refer-
ence to “salary” or “compensation” as described in section 1127(b). Fleming, 3 N.Y.3d at
551.
40. Fleming, 3 N.Y.3d at 551. The Court of Appeals’ rejection of this claim was
followed by a similar rejection of plaintiffs’ arguments as to section 1127’s constitution-
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The consistent theme underlying many state and local tax poli-
cies is that a nonresident should not be subjected to the same tax
burden as that of a resident because of the admittedly lesser cost of
services furnished to nonresidents.41  In imposing a tax on nonresi-
dent income earned within a state or locality, state and local gov-
ernments generally rely on a “benefits received” approach.42  New
York State’s approach to nonresident taxation resembles that of
other states in that it only permits the taxation of nonresident per-
sonal income insofar as it is “derived from or connected with New
York sources.”43  Similarly, on a local scale, the City earnings tax, a
City nonresident income tax in place from 1966 until its repeal in
1999, applied only to wages earned by a nonresident employed in
the City.44  Section 1127 payments, however, place upon nonresi-
dent City employees a financial burden greater than that imposed
on nonresident employees generally because such payments are
not, in a strict legal sense, taxes but, rather, contractual payments.
The practical effect of section 1127 is to place on nonresident City
employees a burden even greater than that imposed on their resi-
dent City colleagues, as nonresidents typically remain subject to an
additional tax on total income in their places of residence.45
ality.  The court affirmed the holding of the Appellate Division and denied plaintiffs
constitutional claims by, once again, citing to the contractual interpretation of section
1127 set forth in the Legum case. Fleming, 3 N.Y.3d at 552 (citing Legum, 55 N.Y.2d at
107).  The Court of Appeals also agreed with the Appellate Division as to the dismissal
of plaintiffs Josen and Berkowitz’s claims under the doctrine of laches. Id. at 552-53.
41. See generally RONALD JOHN HY & WILLIAM L. WAUGH, JR., STATE AND LOCAL TAX
POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE HANDBOOK (1995) (discussing the range of public policies
underlying state and local taxation).
42. Id. at 40. Payments made pursuant to contract terms, rather than tax obliga-
tions, are obviously not subject to this limitation.
43. N.Y. TAX LAW § 631 (McKinney 2003); see also N.Y. TAX LAW § 1301 (McKinney
2006); see generally Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920) (holding that a state’s power
to tax nonresidents “extends only to their property owned within the State and their
business, trade, or profession carried on therein, and the tax is only on such income as
is derived from those sources”); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920)
(“The question of the right to impose a tax on incomes of nonresidents is not a ques-
tion of the nature of the tax nor is it a question of whether income is property or the
acquisition of it a right or a privilege; but it is a question of the situs of the income.”).
44. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ 11-1901–11-1915 (2005).
45. See generally Daniel C. Soriano, Jr., Multi-State Taxation of Personal Income, 111 U.
PA. L. REV. 974, 994 (1963) (examining the different approaches to, and the burdens
associated with, multi-state taxation of personal income).
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The City Council clearly intended to mitigate some of the tax
advantages enjoyed by nonresident City employees by enacting sec-
tion 1127.46  Yet, under the Court of Appeals’ ruling in Fleming, it is
conceivable that a physician working part-time for the City while
also operating a reasonably profitable private practice in his subur-
ban hometown could, in effect, pay a larger amount of money to
the City in the form of section 1127 payments than a City resident
holding the same City employment full-time would pay in personal
income tax.  While prior cases interpreting section 1127 lend some
support to the Court of Appeals’ literal reading of section 1127 in
Fleming, such a result seems inapposite to the City’s professed desire
to “equalize the income of employees who are City residents and
those who are not.”47  The United States Supreme Court has stated
that where “the literal reading of a statute will produce a result de-
monstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters . . .those inten-
tions must be controlling.”48  The Court of Appeals in Fleming
seems to have paid too little attention to this maxim, and its ruling
may discourage employment with the City.
One of the burdens imposed upon nonresident City employees
under section 1127 is that such employees will generally remain
subject to personal income tax liability on their total income in
their actual places of residence, notwithstanding the fact that they
are, in effect, paying resident personal income tax to the City in the
form of section 1127 payments.49  This double financial burden is
well illustrated by the 2003 case of In re Eisenstein.50  In that case, the
State of New York Tax Appeals Tribunal held that a City employee
could not rely on section 1127 payments to offset personal income
tax liability.51  Despite acknowledging compelling reasons for doing
so, the court in Eisenstein held that it was bound by the rule of
Legum: namely, that section 1127 payments are contractual pay-
46. See Fleming, 3 N.Y.3d at 547-48.
47. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 15, at 15 (emphasis added).
48. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982).
49. See generally Soriano, supra note 45.
50. 2003 WL 1790596 (N.Y. Tax. App. Trib. Mar. 27, 2003) (holding that a City
employee who moved from New Jersey to Brooklyn in 1996 yet failed to notify the City
of his change in residency status until 2000 remained liable to the City for personal
income taxes over this four-year period notwithstanding the fact that he had made sec-
tion 1127 payments during the time in question).
51. See Eisenstein, 2003 WL 1790596 at *4.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-4\NLR404.txt unknown Seq: 9  7-JUN-06 10:49
2005-2006] FLEMING V. GIULIANI 1011
ments and, as such, have no relation to and, thus, no ability to offset
an individual’s tax obligations.52
By characterizing the financial burden associated with section
1127 payments in contractual terms, the City has consistently
avoided the constitutional issues raised by nonresident taxation.53
Generally, a state’s ability to tax the income earned by nonresidents
is limited to income earned within the taxing jurisdiction.54  In ad-
dition, New York State Tax Law section 1301 authorizes New York
City to tax only residents on their total personal income.55  Indeed,
the court in Eisenstein implied that if section 1127 were considered
a tax statute, payments by nonresidents thereunder would consti-
tute an “impermissible tax burden.”56
The ruling of the Court of Appeals in Fleming also raises the
question: to what extent should City employees, especially part-time
City employees, be fiscally “encouraged” to live in the City?  For
many City employees the question is moot, as the New York Public
Officers Law section 3(1) requires municipal employees to be “a
resident of the political subdivision or municipal corporation” by
which such person is employed.57  Section 3(2) of the same law,
however, exempts members of the Police Department from this
residency requirement.58
It also bears noting that the City’s present economic situation
is altogether different from that of the 1970s, and many of the same
urgent policy considerations that spurred section 1127’s enactment
are no longer as pressing.  With a population that is expected to
swell from 8.1 million persons in 2000 to 8.4 million persons in
2010, it can hardly be contended that the City faces the same popu-
lation exodus it did in the 1970s.59  Meanwhile, the number of City
52. Id.
53. See HY & WAUGH, supra note 41.
54. See Seth Goldstein, “Resident” Taxpayers: Internal Consistency, Due Process and
State Income Taxation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 119-20 (1991) (“The Supreme Court has
held that the Constitution permits states to tax residents, but not nonresidents, on their
worldwide income.”)
55. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1301 (McKinney 2003).
56. See Eisenstein, 2003 WL 1790596 at *4.
57. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW. § 3(1) (McKinney 2005).
58. Id. § 3(2).
59. Press Release, New York City Department of City Planning, City Planning Re-
leases Newest New Yorkers Immigration Report: Foreign-Born Swell NYC Population
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residents requiring public assistance has declined by nearly 63% be-
tween 1995 and 2003.60  The New York City Independent Budget
Office estimated that the City will add nearly 100,000 private sector
jobs in 2005 and 2006.61  In recent years some City neighborhoods
have even begun to stem the flow of new residents into the five
boroughs by introducing “downzoning” measures, often with the
support of the City administration.62  In light of the City’s current
position, the present seems an odd time to extend section 1127’s
City residency “incentive” by requiring that section 1127 payment
calculations include the total income of nonresident part-time City
employees.
In Fleming, the fact that plaintiffs were part-time City employ-
ees was given little consideration by the Court of Appeals.63  In
terms of statutory analysis, omission of this fact is supportable.  In-
deed, section 1127 clearly refers to “every person seeking employ-
ment with the city of New York . . . regardless of civil service
classification or status.”64  In considering the policies and history un-
derlying section 1127, however, the lack of any discussion as to the
differences between part-time and full-time employment is
unfortunate.
Although section 1127 appears on its face to include all em-
ployees, the legislative history of the statute suggests that its applica-
tion to part-time employees may contravene the City’s professed
purpose of encouraging employees who work for the City to live
there as well.65  In many cases, the reason why certain white-collar
professionals pursue part-time employment over full-time employ-
Figures, Strengthen Economy (Jan. 24, 2005), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dcp/html/about/pr012405.shtml.
60. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, ANNUAL REPORT ON SOC. IN-
DICATORS 75 (2003).
61. NEW YORK CITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, FISCAL OUTLOOK (Dec. 2004).
62. See Janny Scott, In a Still-Growing City, Some Neighborhoods Say Slow Down, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at B1 (“Since 2002, 42 rezonings ‘to preserve neighborhood char-
acter,’ as the administration puts it, have been approved or are under review.  About
3,600 blocks have been rezoned, and more proposals are on the way.  By contrast, offi-
cials say, the city approved only eight such rezonings in the three years before 2002.”).
63. Plaintiffs’ part-time status is only mentioned once in the Court of Appeals
opinion. See Fleming, 3 N.Y.3d at 548.
64. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 1127(a) (emphasis added).
65. See Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 8, at 6.
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ment is to be able to retain flexibility in their professional
pursuits.66
The ability to work part-time benefits employers as well in that
it enables them to “keep and maintain workers that might otherwise
leave the workforce.”67  It can also serve the important City inter-
ests, such as when efforts are made to reduce the overall cost of the
City payroll.  Indeed, when the Giuliani administration conducted a
large-scale cost-saving reduction in full-time City personnel between
1993 and 1996, City expenditures relating to part-time employment
swelled from 0.5% of total City personnel costs to 2.0%.68  The
availability of part-time City employment can thus be seen as a rela-
tively less expensive way for City agencies to cope with full-time staff
cutbacks.
The Court of Appeals’ ruling in Fleming, however, could dis-
suade nonresidents from pursuing such employment, as it is often
said that non-full-time employees have less of an attachment to
their jobs than their full-time equivalents.69  The Court of Appeals’
ruling in Fleming essentially creates a situation where the nonresi-
dent City employee is subject to double-taxation of total personal
income, while the contractual character of section 1127 precludes
the use of section 1127 payments to offset income tax liability else-
where.70  Where the acceptance of a part-time job with the City by a
nonresident would subject significant additional sources of income
to section 1127’s reach, the statute as construed by the Court of
Appeals in Fleming creates a strong disincentive to part-time City
employment.
Fleming is yet another in a line of cases challenging what is, in
effect if not in name, a tax on the personal income, wherever de-
rived, of nonresident individuals.71  Although payment obligations
66. See The Balancing Act: Key Factors for Part-Time Workers During Prime Working Years
(Employment Policy Foundation), Nov. 24, 2003, at 1.
67. Id.
68. The Municipal Workforce: Big as a Decade Ago, but Composition has Changed, INSIDE
THE BUDGET 92 (New York City Indep. Budget Office) Dec. 11, 2001, at 2.
69. See Danielle D. van Jaarsveld, Overcoming Obstacles to Worker Representation: In-
sights from the Temporary Agency Workforce, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 355, 377 (2005-2006).
70. See Eisenstein, 2003 WL 1790596 at *4.
71. See, e.g., Legum, 55 N.Y.2d 104; Ganley, 94 N.Y.2d 207; Hill v. City of New York,
678 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1st Dep’t 1998); Lieutenants Benevolent Assn., 730 N.Y.S.2d 78; Eisen-
stein, 2003 WL 1790596.
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under section 1127 clearly present the nonresident part-time City
employee with an “incentive,” it would appear hasty to assume he
would not choose severing his professional ties to the City entirely
to pursue employment in a more favorable taxing jurisdiction.  The
ruling in Fleming displays, once more, the favor shown by the Court
of Appeals toward the City’s contractual interpretation of section
1127.  Yet to encourage the relocation of part-time City employees
by fiscal means, especially when the City is by no means still affected
by the decrease in taxable population that typified the City’s fiscal
crisis of the 1970s, seems a harsh policy that fails to take into ac-
count drastic changes in the City’s economy and population.  The
court’s holding in Fleming could easily have the practical effect of
discouraging part-time employment with the City; such a result
might well contravene the purpose section 1127 was designed to
serve.
